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sounder view. 3 ' Prete v. Cray is legally sound for tlhere is no logical reason
why an adjoining landowner should be made to suffer a loss merely because
he has placed an improvement on his land which does not increase the lateral
pressure. It should be noted that the rule in this case is applied only where it
32
has been coficlusively proven that such is the fact.
It is submitted therefore that the rule of Prete v. Cray is consistent with
all principles of justice, is economically expedient and should be followed in
New York.33
STANLEY S. GREENt

THE "FLASH OF GENIUS" STANDARD OF
PATENTABLE INVENTION
In December, 1941, the President appointed the National Patent Planning
Commission to conduct a comprehensive survey and study of the United States
patent system, and to consider whether the system now provides the maximum
service in stimulating the inventive genius of the people and in furthering prompt
utilization of its fruits for the public good. The Commission published its
first report in June, 1943.1 The report contains a fitting tribute to the important role played by the American patent system in promoting industrial progress, improving the standard of living, and contributing to public safety and
welfare. 2 The report also specifically denies adverse charges with respect to
hindrance of the war effort by patents.3
The major part of the report is devoted to recommendations for modifying the patent laws and their administration in Qrder to obviate certain aspects of their operation which have been the principal sources of criticism.
A portion of the report relates to the establishment of a uniform standard
of invention. 4 Recognizing the destructive effect of uncertainty as to the
validity of patents, the Commission proposes, as a measure for the elimination of divergence of standards of invention, as between the Patent Office and
the various courts charged with the enforcement of patent rights, the establishment of a single Court of Patent Appeals. to review decisions of the District
Courts in patent cases, thus assuming the jurisdiction now exercised by the
31. See note to Stearns' Ex'r. v. Richmond, 29 Am. St. Rep. 758, 765 (1892).
32. The rule of Prete v. Cray has been adopted by the American Law Institute. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, c. 39, § 817 (2) and comment on Subsection 2.
33. Supra, note 16.
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Circuit Courts, and re-examination by the Patent Office of the validity of a
patent, whenever it is attacked in a proceeding before a District Court, by certification of the record to the Patent Office for a report of an advisory nature
on the validity of the patent.0
In addition to matters of procedure, the Commission has recommended a
declaration of national policy by Congressional enactment, that "patentability
shall be determined objectively by the nature of the contribution to the advancement of the art, and, not subjectively by the nature of the process by
which the invention may have been accomplished." 7
One entitled to a patent is now defined in the statute . as "any person who
has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof." Thus
in addition to novelty and utility, "invention" is essential to the patentability
of any new or improved art, machine, manufacture or composition, and consequently, to the validity of a patent issued therefor.P What constitutes invention is left to the determination of the Patent Office and the Courts.
In general, it may be said that patentable invention is the increment by
which an inventor's contribution to the advancement of a given field of technology exceeds not only what was previously known in that field, but also
such variations of prior knowledge as would be obvious to the hverage worker
skilled in that art. Thus, it has been held that invention is a new display
of ingenuity beyond the compass of the routineer,' 0 and must be judged by
what was in the public demesne, as ivell in the inventor's favor as against
him." Where the improvement is found to be merely the work of a skillful
mechanic,12 to involve merely ordinary "mechanical or engineering skill,'" or
to constitute a display of the experienced skill of the calling involving only
the exercise of the ordinary faculties of reasoning upon material supplied by
a special knowledge and facility of manipulation resulting from habitual and
intelligent practice,' 4 it is generally held that there is an absence of that degree
of ingenuity which constitutes the essential element of every invention:
The nature of the result achieved by the inventor is an important considera5. Id. at V C.
6. Id. at V B.
7. Id. at V A.
8. 56 STAT. 1212, 36 U. S. C. A. 31 (1939).
9. Thompson v. Boisselier, 114 U. S. 1, 11, 5 Sup. Ct. 1042 (1885).
10. Kirsch Mfg. Co. v. Gould-Mersereau, 6 F. (2d) 793, 794 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
11. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Glidden Co., 67 F. (2d) 392, 395 (C: C. A.
2d, 1933).
12. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How.248 (U. S. 1851).
13. 'Concrete Appliances Co. v. Gomery, 269 U. S. 177, 185, 46 Sup. Ct. 42 (1925).
14. Saranac Automatic Machine Co. v. Wirebounds Patents Co., 282 U. S. 704, 713,' 51
Sup. Ct. 232 (1931).
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tion in determining whether or not his contribution is patentable. It has been
aptly said that a combination to be patentable must produce a different force,
effect or result in the combined forces or processes from that given by their
separate parts.15 In other words, the effect of a patentable combination must
be something more than the mere sum of the effects of its separate parts. The
mere application of devices old in other arts to similar uses is not invention
meriting a patent.1 6
Practice in the Patent Office represents substantially the application of the
principles just set forth. Each patent application is examined by an examiner
specializing in the field of the art to which the application relates, who is
familiar with the state of the art as reflected in prior patents and publications.
The applicant is required to point out how his claims distinguish from the
disclosures cited by the examiner, to restrict them to the truly inventive portion of his concept, and to convince the examiner that they define something
more than an obvious variation of prior knowledge.
Decisions applying the foregoing principles, and the practice of the Patent
Office, conform with the recommendation of the National Patent Planning
Commission that patentabilty ought to be determined objectively by the nature of the contribution to the advancement of the art, and not subjectively
by the nature of the mental process by which the invention may have been
achieved. The question whether of not the inventor's contribution is an obvious one or not necessarily involves a personal, and hence subjective,
opinion--a "value judgment"-but it was not this kind of subjective determination, by the Patent Office or by the Courts, which the National Patent
Planning Commission intended to exclude. The reason for the recommendation of the Commission that such a policy be declared by Congressional enactment apparently is intended to overcome a "new doctrinal trend,"18 evidenced
in a relatively recent line of decisions, particularly in the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, and in the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Cuno Engineering Co. v. Automatic Devices Corp.'9
Within the last decade, a number of decisions in the Second Circuit have
formulated a new test for invention, more restrictive than the principles
applied by the Patent Office and by the courts in the decisions discussed above.
The Second Circilit appears to 'hold, in effect, that advances in the art which
result from purposeful research or experimentation do not constitute patentable
invention. In the Cuno decision, the Supreme Court appears to have given
a more positive expression to the restrictive test of the Second Circuit, holding that a new device, to be patentable, must .reveal the "flash of creative
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U. S. 347, Syllabus (1875).
See note 13 supra.
See note 10 supra.
Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F. (2d) 632, 636 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
314 U. S. 84, 62 Sup. Ct. 37 (1941).
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genius." Thus, the standard of patentable invention represented by these
decisions is apparently based upon the nature of the mental processes of the
patentee-inventor by 'which he achieved the advancement in the art claimed
in his patent, rather than solely upon the objective nature of the advancement itself, tested against the background of the prior art. In this respect,
the new test or standard of ipvention of the Second Circuit and the Supreme
Court is subjective.
Reference to a few decisions of the Second Circuit will indicate the application of the aforesaid restrictive test for invention. For example, in a decision
involving a chemical patent,20 the court recognized that much that is valuable
has been discovered by a system of trial and error, but held that invention
demands more than that; 'omething more than routine testing' of obvious
combinations, some departure ,which required originality or independence of
conception, some resumption of a line of experiments from which the art
lookeol away was said to be required. The patent was held invalid as directed
merely to one of those steps which demand only patient experiment. In another decision, 21 the court recognized that happy solutions may be reached
by testing out variants especially, in the chemical and electrical field-merely
by permutations of old elements--but' held that the patent law does not protect such industrial achievements. Something more personal to the inventor
which better measures his imaginative powers was said to be required. It
was held unpatentable in another case2 2 to try out many forms, until what
appeared to be the best-was found. The court held that, as distinguished
from sudden flashes of genius, the solution of a problem demanding no more
than intelligent, well-turned and persistent experiments, in the light of the
defects of past experience did not amount to patentable invention. Another
patent was held invalid2 as based merely upon the slow but inevitable progress of an industry through trial and error-upon the exercise of persistent
and intelligent search for improvement. The court referred to the fact that
the Supreme Court had- for a decade or more shown an increasing disposition to raise the standard of originality necessary for a patent, and recognized
therein a pronounced "new doctrinal trend" which the court, proposed cautiously to follow and not to resist.
As it happens, it was in a reversal of a Second Circuit decision that the
Supreme Court enunciated the "flash of genius" test. In Automatic Devies
Corp. v. Cuno Engineering Co., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held the
patent in suit valid and infringed, stating:
20. Ruben Condenser Co. v. Aerovox Corp., 77 F. (2d) 266, 267 (C. C. A. 2d,. 1935)
21. Ruben Condenser Co. v. Copeand Refrigeration Corp, 85 F. (2d) 537 (C. C. A
2d, 1936).
22. General Motors Corp. v. Preferred Electric & Wire Corp., 109 F. (2d) 615 (C. C. A.
2d, 1940).
23. See note 18 supra.
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"If patents are to go to those who contribute new appliances that are beyond
the limited imagination of the ordinary skilled person, this invention seems to us to
merit a patent."24
The Supreme Court reversed this decision, stating:
"Since Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (11 How. 248, decided in 1851), it has been
recognized that if an improvement is to obtain the privileged position of a patent
more ingenuity must be involved than the work of a mechanic skilled in the art....
That is. to say, a new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of the calling. If it fails, it has not established
its right to a private grant on the public domain. . . . We cannot conclude that his
skill in making this contribution reached the level of inventive genius which the
Constitution (Art. I § 8) authorizes Congress to reward." 25
Thus, the "new doctrinal trend" to which the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals referred, in a decision 26 subsequent to that of the Supreme Court in
the Cuno case, apparently injects into the determination of what is patentable
invention and what is not, the subjective mental processes by which the inventor arrived at his invention. If the inventor made his advance by purposeful experimentation, it is not invention; but if he arrived at it by a flash of
genius; or flash of thought, he may be rewarded with a patent. It seems clear
that the recommendation of the National Patent Planning Commission was
directed principally against this trend; in suggesting legislation expressly re2
jecting a subjective test for patentable inventionY.
Earlier authorities support the application of an objective test. Thus, in an
early decision,2 8 Justice Story said:
"It is of no consequence whether the thing be simple or complicated; whether
it be by accident or by long laborious thought, or by an instantaneous flash of
mind, that it is first done. The law looks to the fact and not to the process by
which it is accomplished. It gives the first inventor or discoverer of the thing the
exclusive right, and asks nothing as to the mode or extent of the application of his
genius to conceive or execute it."
An authoritative text on patent lawm states that the law does not distinguish
between creative faculties resulting from long consideration, study and experiment, and those attaining their end by sudden intuition, accident, or a flash
of thought. Many decisions are to the same effect. An invention may be the
24.

117 F. (2d) 361, 364 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).

25. Cuno Engineering Co. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U. S. 84, 90-91, 62 Sup. Ct.
37 (1941), italics added.
26. See note 18 supra.
27. Cf. Heard, Uniform Standard of Invention (1943) 25 JoURNAL oF THrE PATENT OsriCE
SociETY 676.
28. Earle v. Sawyer, 4 Mason 16 (C. C. D. Mass. 1825).
29. WALXER, PATENTS (Deller ed. 1937) § 114.
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result of a flash of thought, or of long and abortive experiments and baffled
attempts 3 0-a lucky casual thought, or the fruit of a lifetime devoted to the
profoundest thought and the rnost ingenious experiments 31-the revelation of
a flash of thought or the result of long consideration. 32 In Waht Clipper Corp.
v. Andis Clipper Co.,3 3 the Seventh Circuit Court said:
"What is genius? What, an inventive genius? May only an inventive genius
receive a valid patent? Instead of comparing the mental activities (and eccentricities) of genius, and the 'mechanic skilled in the art,' it would seem safer and
more accurate to study the product itself. .

.

. if the improvement be unusual, or

if there be doubt, and the public has given its tribute, the judge should accord to
the creator of the article the title of inventor."
The new doctrinal trend has not met with an entirely felicitous reception.
In Saltex Looms Inc. -. Collins & Aikman Corp.,3 4 a District Court remarked:
"To apply as a practical test the requirement of 'flash of creative genius' suggeste'd in Cuno Engineering Co. v. Automatic Devices Corp. may not always be
free of difficulty. Especially would this be so in appraising conceptions developed
in research laboratories. However, each group of facts would determine its applicability."
In Wallace v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,l 5 it was said:
"Apparently, the restricted monopoly of patent rights is not to reward 'the
exercise of persistent and intelligent search for improvement!' Such is not deemed
to 'reveal the flash of creative genius' specified as required in Cuno Engineering
Co. v. Automatic Devices Corp. .

.

. And yet it must be recalled that genius has

once been defined as the infinite capacity for taking pains. The approved approach
to most unsolved problems is the studious and often plodding one, and no reliable
substitute has been suggested, even though a solution thereby accomplished is not
judicially deemed to attain to the status of patentable invention."
In the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Cuno decision was not interpreted
as indicating anything more significant than that the quality of invention is
something more than expected mechanical skill.3 6 The Court remarked:
"Long experience with assailed inventions in trial and on review led us in humility
to the conclusion that the inventive concept is an abstraction impossible to define,
and so for that reason courts have sought for simple rules by which its presence
may be detected, and while'these have proved helpful, they are never absolute. .. ."
30. Magic Ruffle Co. v. Douglas, Fed. Cas. No. 8948 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1863).
31. Middletown Tool Co. v. Judd, Fed. Cas. No. 9536 (C. C. D. Conn. 1867).
32. Snyder v. Fisher, 1897 Commissioner's Decisions 254, 257 (C. C. A.. D. C.

1897).
33.
34.
35.
36.

66 F. (2d), 162, 164 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933).
43 Fed. Supp. 914, 920 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
45 Fed. -Supp. 465, 466 (E. D. N. Y. 1942).
Tralion Engineering Corp. v. Dirkes, 136 F. (2d) 24, 27 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943).
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized 7 that standards of invention. may grow more exacting, but rejected modification in meaning or definition of invention. The court said:
"If we examine the finished machine, apparatus, or process. . . is it understandable to say that ther'e is patentable novelty if it results from a flash of genius,
but not patentable invention if it is the result of long continued experimentation?
We think not. . . . nearly all advance is made in laboratories where many experiments are made and discoveries result from the trial and error method."

In Picard v. United Aircraft Corp.,8s (one of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals decisions holding a patent invalid, and referring to the new doctrinal
trend of the Supreme Court, raising the standard of originality required for
a patent), Judge Frank, in his concurring opinion,39 suggests that the "flash
of creative genius" of the Cuno decision is what, in some earlier decisions, was
called a "flash of thought, ' 40 and suggests that the so-called new attitude of
the Supreme Court may be ascribed to the trend toward methods in research
whereby discoveries are now usualiy made in group laboratories, such discoveries being precisely those which according to the test announced by Judge
Learned Hand in the case do not amount to inventions. Judge Frank's opinion
contains a review of what some of the critics of the patent system have contended. 41 For example, it has been said that important advances arise nearly
simultaneously at many points, and are the result of an advancing knowledge
and technology, and the advent of a specific human need and common opportunity. The individual inventor in most .cases could not hold his discovery
a secret even if he wished, since it would not be long in these intense times
before some other inventor would supply the necessary creative thought. The
old justification for extension of exclusive monopoly no longer holds. However,
Judge Frank quoted from Scott and Williams Co. v. Wisnant:4
"After a new invention is completed, it is easy to see how it was accomplished.
43
But such enlightenment resembling apparent simplicity, is the product of hindsight."
Referring to the majority decision holding the patent in suit invalid, Judge
Frank remarks, 44 "If Judge Hand's yardstick is applied, a valid patent will,
usually, be a function of judicial scientific ignorance."
37. Chicago Steel Foundry Co. v. Burnside Steel Foundry Co., 132 F. (2d) 812
816 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943).
38. 128 F. (2d) 632 (C. C. A. 2d, 19.42).
39. Id. at 641.
40. Densmore v. Scofield, 102 U. S. 375, 378 (1880).
41. Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F. (2d) 632, 640-641 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
42. 126 F. (2d) 19, 22 (C. C. A. 4th. 1942).
43. Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F. (2d) 632, 638-639 (C. C. A. 2d,
1942).
44. Id. at 641.
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As a solution to this. aspect of the situation, Judge Frank suggests that
judges should consult thoroughly disinterested experts in applying tests for
invention. He remarks45 that such experts would probably find that only an
infinitesimal percentage of so-called invention would measure up to Judge
Hand's test, excluding what is discovered by trial and error, and the exercise of persistent and intelligent search for improvement.
On the other hand, Judge Frank states46 that there seems to be room for
some kind of patent monopoly which through hope of rewards to be gained
will induce venturesome investors to risk the large sums needed to bring the
invention to the commercially useful stage. If we do not need patents as a
bait for inventors, we may still need them as a lure for investors. Judge Frank
concludes 47 that it would seem unfair and unwise to apply so severe a test
as that of Judge Hand as to render a patent invalid which would never have
been developed commercially but for the protection afforded by the patent
monopoly.
The report of the National Patent Planning Commission goes far to support the latter viewpoint of Judge Frank. The report states48 that the American Patent system has
1. Encouraged and rewarded inventiveness and creativeness, producing new products
and processes which have placed the United States far ahead of other countries in the
field of scientific and technological endeavor;
2. Stimulated American inventors to origipiate a major portion of the important industrial and basic inventions of the past 150 years;
3. Facilitated the rapid development and general application of new discoveries in the
United States to an extent exceeding that of any other country;
4. Contributed to the achievement of the highest standard of living that any nation
has ever enjoyed;
5. Stimulated creation and development of products and processes necessary to arm the
Nation and to wage successful war;
6. Contributed to the improvement of the publiq health and the public safety, and
7. Operated to protect the individual and small business concerns during the formative period of a new enterprise.

In its recommendation that appellate jurisdiction in patent suits be given
exclusively to a single Patent Court of Appeals, and that provision be made for
District Courts to submit records to the Patent Office for advisory action, the
Commission seems to have answered the problem of overcoming the inadequacy
of judicial experience to cope with 'highly technical matters arising in patent
litigation. It can scarcely be doubted that a more competent and disinterested
staff of experts could be found than in the Patent Office. Their advice, coupled
45.
46.

Id. at 640.
Id. at 642.

47. Id. at 643.
48. See note 2 supra.

